Rivers - the other definitive questions

I very much enjoy this examination of phalanx combat so I have also been looking for evidence that troops formed in phalanx successfully forced a passage across a defended river. I felt that if I could identify some instance where this occurred, I could provide some balance to the discussion. Apologies for the length of this response – read on only if you are interested in the history of the period, or jump to the summary below.

I've already shown that the battles near the Pinarus River (Issus - 333 BC) and the Trebia River (218 BC) provide little if any support for the proposition. Granicus (334 BC) too is rather suspect. It is plausible that the smaller Persian army (possibly around 35,000 men - Fox) might have been intending to defend the steep banks of the Granicus River against Alexander's significantly larger army (probably 50,000 men - Fox). However the three extant ancient accounts (Arrian, Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus) are derived from sources now lost, and there are so many contradictions that it is difficult to gain any degree of certainty. Arrian of Nicomedia's description of the heroic Alexander fixing the enemy in place with the phalanx while he feinted the Persians out of position and then charged deep into the Persian battle line to kill several noble Persian commanders is very difficult to believe and has been challenged by a number of scholars (refer to Chaeronea below). Arrian greatly admired Alexander and was rarely critical of him, except with respect to some of Alexander's more excessive behaviours however most modern scholars now dismiss this account as false. For example:

"There are two accounts of the battle. Arrian and Plutarch say that Alexander attacked directly across the river (Anabasis, 1.13; Life of Alexander, 16). This manoeuver, however, is impossible, because the banks are too steep for horses to climb - and little has changed since Antiquity. The other story is told by the historian Diodorus of Sicily (World History, 17.19.3), who says that the Macedonians crossed the Granicus during the night, and attacked the Persians on the plain beyond the river before dawn. This was a good stratagem: the Persians were accustomed to sacrifice to the rising sun before they armed themselves, and would be unprepared. [https://www.livius.org/articles/battle/granicus/]"

Others go even further. Peter Green concludes that Arrian's version of events is simply political propaganda intended to cover up an initial Macedonian defeat and Paul Cartledge highlights the manner in which Parmenion is discredited, also ascribing a political motive. In any event, on the balance of probabilities, the Battle of Granicus is unlikely to provide an example of close order infantry successfully forcing a passage across a river.

It is interesting to examine other battles of the period in which both phalanx and river are present.

Marathon 490 BC: the width of the battlefield was constrained between the coast, low lying swampy areas around streams and higher inland terrain. When the Persians broke, those that ran into the swampy terrain drowned, as did many who tried to regain their ships. This gives some support for DBA's rout rules.

Mycale 479 BC: the first Greek victory in Asia. Although there were streams near the Persian camp, they chose to defend on the flat, open plain, forgoing any potential advantage to be gained by defending a river bank.

Amphipolis 422 BC: occurring before the actual battle, Livy describes a Spartan surprise attack across a bridge against a small guard force, aided by surprise, stormy weather and treason in the ranks of the guard [Livy, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.103.5]. This would be an interesting scenario, but unfortunately the bridge crossing does not involve a phalanx.

Anapus River 415 BC: or the first Battle of Syracuse fought between Athenians and Syracusans near the Anapus River, but apparently not over it. The Syracusan forces had the river at their back and the bridge over the river had been destroyed, but the river was fordable. When the Argives broke the Syracusan left wing the Syracusans fled back across the river, protected by their cavalry. Casualties were light on both sides and, contrary to events at Marathon, the river did not cause a catastrophe.

Crossing of the Centrites River 401 BC (my favourite!): here Xenophon describes the 10,000 Greek mercenaries blocked by the formidable Centrites with its cliff-like banks, with enemies both in front and behind. Stirring stuff! “...the Hellenes endeavoured to cross, but on their making the attempt the water proved 6 to be more than breast-deep, and the river bed was rough with great slippery stones, and as to holding their arms in the water, it was out of the question--the stream swept them away--or if they tried to carry them over the head, the body was left exposed to the arrows and other missiles...” [Anabasis, Book III, part III, 23]. However after some useful divine intervention a ford was discovered and a well crafted diversion lured the defenders out of position. Javelinmen and slingers secured the crossing point and as soon as it was evident that the river crossing could not be intercepted, panic ensued among the defenders and they fled to higher ground. Clearly, bodies of troops formed in close order were not useful in forcing the crossing. They had to be protected by the faster, more lightly armed skirmishers.

Chaeronea 338 BC: battle lines were drawn up between the river Kephisos and a projecting spur of Mount Aktion. This is a good example of the use of a river and difficult terrain to protect an army’s flanks. Alexander’s cavalry charge into a gap in the enemy line proved decisive. Sound familiar?

The Jaxartes 329 BC: here Alexander’s troops crossed the river in boats, protected by catapults that out ranged the Scythian bows and forced the defenders to retire out of range. Following the crossing, Alexander attempted to provoke a battle with the much more mobile Scythians by ordering a unit of cavalry forward as a sacrifice. The Scythians could not resist and attacked, were subsequently caught by Alexander’s light troops and a massacre ensued.

Crossing the Hydaspes River (326 BC): the Hydaspes was a huge river, definitely not fordable against opposition. Alexander left his phalanx behind, marched a considerable distance upstream to Jhelum to find an undefended location, crossed in ships probably during a storm, and then moved to engage Porus in a more conventional battle, facing elephants for the first time.

Magnesia 190 BC: fought between the Antiochus and Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus, supported by Eumenes III of Pergamum. After some preliminary skirmishes, Scipio’s forces had to cross the Phrygius River within 4 miles of the Seleucid army. Apparently they were unopposed and one has to wonder why? Both armies seemed to prefer a deployment in which the river protected a flank.

SUMMARY

As hard as I have looked, I cannot find any example of a phalanx successfully forcing a passage across a river by its own combat power. Indeed, on the few instances where this was attempted, the phalanx had to be rescued by other troops. Rivers were used frequently as flank protection because they had such a bad impact on formed troops. The consistent theme that has emerged is one of ancient commanders of pike and spear armies avoiding contested river crossings whenever possible, using manoeuvre to find a suitable crossing point and fighting with more appropriate troops when necessary. Defending a river bank, unless by a significantly smaller force, also seems to be unattractive. Clearly, river banks were often obstructed by vegetation, or were muddy, or were too irregular, or simply did not allow for effective command and control. 

I take the point that there may be an element of “perception”, or from my perspective “relevance”, involved. If battles were fought across creeks and streams that had little or no impact on the battle, their presence may not have been recorded, so the historical record may well be biased in this respect. If you want a river on the board, but don’t want it to have its historical effect on the battle, consider applying a house-rule to treat the river as of negligible effect.  It may be arguable that defenders on a river bank should also experience a degree of disorder, so perhaps a house-rule to that effect might be attractive.

However the author says that “DBA is an ancient period wargame played on a small board, using a minimal number of model figures and the simplest set of rules that can produce a historically and visually realistic and exciting game.” I think he has achieved this objective and I for one am reluctant to tinker with it.

I was defending: www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=2448514392137101&set=oa.1081167195418875&type=3&theater&ifg=1

And I think my final statement answers your second question.

That’s why troops get a +1 for the riverbank bonus Baldie (unless the river is Paltry).

And that was an excellent analysis of river fighting Chaotic. I thoroughly enjoyed it.

But remember...no-one is asking to change a single solitary word of Phil Barker’s rules.
It just a question of the interpretation of the page 6 river rule.

Since the rules do not tells us what effect rivers have on combat (apart from the riverbank bonus,
and that “For movement, they are neither good nor other going”), we players are left in limbo.

Thus we have no choice but to try and patch the gap in the river rules in our own way...
....either by making them unplayable (so they are rarely if ever used) or by making them playable
(and we get to see them more often on our wargames table).

If you want rivers to strip-away side and rear-support, although nowhere in the rules does it say do this,
then fine...I will simply refuse to cross such a river and the game will always be an unsatisfying stalemate.

And that applies even in a tournament.
If I advance without rear support, I’ll get slaughtered, and gain no points.
If I don’t advance, there will be no battle, and I will still gain no points.
I’m being offered a lose-lose situation...so I might as well rob my opponent of his points as well.



Some Helpful Downloads can be found here: fanaticus-dba.wikia.com/wiki/Category:Reference_sheets_and_epitomes
And here is the latest Jan 2019 FAQ: fanaticus-dba.wikia.com/wiki/FAQ_2019_1st_Quarter

That's the mechanism for roads, clearly detailed. "Combat on it [road] is in the going it is passing through".
There is no such mechanism for rivers, you are extrapolating.



Sure.
"Rear support factors" and "Flank support factors" require "in good going" (top of page 11).
So, what is good going? We turn to page 6.
a) " ... flat board or cloth representing flat GOOD GOING such as pasture ..." (not applicable to river)
b) "Gentle Hills and playing surface other than terrain features are GOOD GOING" (not applicable to river either, note that the 2nd part is really just a repeat of a))
c) "Plough is GOOD GOING but changes to ROUGH GOING if ..." (not applicable)

As a river is neither of these, one of the requirements for side/rear support is not met.


Rivers are neither good, rough nor bad going for anything. They are ... rivers. As simple as that. A well established WRG approach, similar to the one used in DBM (note the single M).

And please stop repeating that rivers are unplayable, it's just incorrect as shown by several examples on this thread.

I thought we'd comprehensively settled the historical context? So far, no historical justification for a phalanx fighting effectively across a defended river has been presented - including from the two Alexandrian battles suggested. Any outcome that increases the ability of a phalanx to fight across a river would generate ahistorical situations. There may be other reasons why players see this as desirable, but accurate historical representation isn't one of them.

I shall continue to play rivers as Stevie and I have indicated. They work that way, give a good game, and are the only linear obstacle available to us. Everyone else can do whatever they feel is best. To each their own, and ultimately it is about enjoying your gaming.

In my case, rivers count as the going they are in for combat, as at the scale represented by DBA, the going is the dominant effect. Done and dusted.

You guys do what you feel works for you.